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Commentary
Friends, friendlessness, and social cognition
Henry M. Wellman*
Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
I applaud the methods and findings of the target article by Fink and colleagues (Brit. J. Dev.
Psychol, 2015; 33, 1–17) who demonstrate an important link between theory of mind and
children’s social lives. In particular, enhanced theory of mind in preschool buffers children
from friendlessness in the transition to school. Going further, I suggest needed steps for
the field to experimentally demonstrate causal links between children’s theory of mind
and their social actions and interactions.
Hughes and Cutting (1999) stated decades ago that ‘children’s social lives are dramatically
transformedwhen they can understand that human actions are governed bymental states
such as beliefs, desires and intentions’ (p. 429). This echoed the presumption, present
from the first research on theory of mind (ToM), that children’s social cognition deeply
influences their social actions and interactions. In those early days, however, evidence for
the real-life influence of ToMwas surprisingly unavailable.Now, on the basis of sometimes
strong and sometimes sketchy data,we know (with varying degrees of certainty) that ToM
is linked to children’s conversations, pretence, peer acceptance, attempts to lie and
persuade others, and more.
The place where data are especially comprehensive concerns the relation of ToM
to peer acceptance and popularity. Such studies typically focus on the preschool
years where dramatic ToM ‘action’ takes place, and typically focus on children’s
emerging understanding of false beliefs. Preschool children with enhanced false belief
understanding are more popular and accepted in Israel, Australia, the United
Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and other locales. This is true when peer
acceptance is measured via teacher ratings or via peer sociometric ratings and
nomination of ‘children I like to play with’. The links are concurrent and longitudinal
and typically persist when covariates such as the child’s age or language competence
are partialled out.
The wisdom of the present study by Fink, Begeer, Peterson, Slaughter, and
deRosnay (2015) is to dig still deeper into this general finding. They do so, first, by
looking at a particularly striking, and as it turns out, important aspect of peer
acceptance and interaction: friendlessness or, in reverse, possession of at least one
close mutual friend. Intriguingly, peer rejection and peer friendlessness are not the
same: ‘Many children who are disliked or ignored by the group in general have at least
one best friend and are satisfied by this friendship situation. Conversely, some
children who are group “popularity stars” have no mutual friends at all and feel lonely
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and dissatisfied’ (p. 2). Moreover, the authors dig deeper by moving beyond
preschool to examine entry to school, a crucial transition in the child’s social life and
peer relations.
Fink et al. find that children with enhanced ToM in preschool are buffered from
friendlessness in the transition to school. To my mind, their research provides us
particularly strong findings linking ToM and social life: establishing a well-controlled,
prospective, longitudinal link that spans from preschool to school entry. Moreover, as the
authors argue, child friendships and in particular friendlessness matters. ‘Being friendless
has numerous negative consequences, impacting psychological wellbeing during
childhood and into adolescence. . . including low self worth, social anxiety, depression,
loneliness and suicidal. . . ideation’ (p. 1).
One can always find limits and gaps in any study, but I take the present findings as
solid and important. Yet, I also want to suggest that the field in general now needs to
go further. Correlational data, even well-controlled prospective, longitudinal findings
such as we see here, can only take us so far in answering the question of whether
ToM plays a direct and important role in engendering children’s social actions and
thereby influencing their social lives. Experimental research is needed; and needed
not only because of its possible practical applications (e.g., diminishing child
friendlessness), but also to theoretically pin down the developmental mechanisms at
play.
To illustrate, let me shift gears to research on children’s lying. Studies with Western
and non-Western children consistently reveal that children’s theory-of-mind understand-
ing significantly correlates with their verbal deception (Lee, 2013). But does ToM play a
direct and important role in engendering verbal deception in children? No direct
experimental evidence exists to confirm this speculation derived from correlational
findings. So, my collaborators and I (Fu, Ding, Wang, Wellman, & Lee, 2014) aimed to
provide the needed data by examining the effect of theory-of-mind training on children’s
deceptive behaviour.
The focal taskwas a hidden-object temptation taskwhere children are told not to peek
at a hidden toy when an adult leaves the room. Many children peek and further when
asked whether they peeked, they deny their transgression. They lie. Very young children,
however, do not lie; they straightforwardly admit that they peeked.
In our research, 3-year-olds first completed a set of pre-tests, focally the
no-peeking task and some ToM tasks (as well as an IQ test and an executive
functioning task). We chose children who could not lie at all in the peeking task, and
then they completed training sessions followed by post-tests. In training, the
experimental children solved a series of false belief tasks, with feedback, daily for
6 days. The control children solved Piagetian conservation tasks daily for 6 days. On
the seventh day and 1 month later, children again completed the ToM and lying tasks
just as in pre-test. Through learning how to solve the false belief tasks for 1 week, the
experimental children’s ToM scores improved significantly more than the control
children. Moreover, focally, the experimental group also became significantly more
likely to lie about their peeking in the no-peeking task, and this training effect
remained 1 month later.
Other research shows that we can successfully enhance the theory-of-mind
understandings of preschool children via multiple microgenetic sessions (as used in
this lying research). Through such methods, children can achieve new social cognitive
insights that generalize and are retained months later; this can be done not just with
typically developing children but also those who normatively experience extended
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ToM delays (e.g., deaf children of hearing parents; Wellman & Peterson, 2013). It is
time to see whether such theory-of-mind changes directly impact children’s social
actions, not just for example in temptation laboratory tasks, but in more real-life
situations and interactions – potentially even children’s friendship interactions and
outcomes.
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